




































apital	 is,	 as	 Jonathan	 Nitzan	 and	 Shimshon	 Bichler	 (2009)	 argue,	 “a	 symbolic	
quantification	 of	 power,	 representing	 the	 organized	 power	 of	 dominant	 capital	
groups	to	reshape	their	society.”	This	paper	argues	that	a	crucial	way	of	structuring	
the	organized	power	of	financial	corporations	is	a	propertization	of	contractual	claims.	This	










Property	 is	 a	 classical	 notion	 that	 social	 science	has	used	 to	 explain	 the	essence	of	
capitalism.	For	example,	classical	writers,	such	as	Karl	Marx	and	Max	Weber,	argued	that	the	
nature	 of	 the	 transition	 from	 feudalism	 to	 capitalism	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 rise	 of	
absolute	private	property.	However,	this	classical	notion	disappears	in	the	literature	on	the	
















common	 natural	 resources	 or	 intellectual	 abilities	 such	 as	 ideas	 and	 knowledge.	 These	
resources	 and	 abilities	 are	 originally	 not	 property	 but	 should	 be	 commonly	 available	 to	
everybody	 according	 to	 the	 social	 rules	 of	 distribution.	 But	 when	 someone	 is	 granted	



















explained	 not	 only	 that	 how	 capitalist	 power	 is	 commodified	 but	 also	 that	 how	 it	 is	
structured	and	restructured.	I	believe	that	the	concept	of	propertization	contributes	to	the	
latter	explanation.			





contractual	 claims	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 rising	 and	 structuring	 of	 corporate	 power,	
especially	money	market	 funds	 (hereafter,	MMFs)	 and	 their	money‐creation	mechanism.	




extend	 this	 concept	 of	 propertization	 into	 explaining	 the	 money‐creation	 mechanism	 of	








of	 the	 Investment	 Company	 Act	 of	 1940	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 MMFs	 have	 rarely	 been	
discussed	in	the	literature	on	the	2008	crisis	because	many	scholars	have	focused	too	much	
on	 securitization	 and	 subprime	 mortgages.	 However,	 as	 a	 few	 scholars	 have	 correctly	
noticed,	 MMFs	 played	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 creating	 the	 crisis	 (Gorton	 &	Metric	 2010)	 and	
transmitted	it	to	Western	Europe	(Baba,	Robert,	&	Ramaswamy	2009).	
















Western	 law	 has	 Roman	 origins	 and	 is	 structured	 by	 the	 Roman	 legal	 division	 of	






to	 contractual	 claims.	This	 argument	 allows	us	 to	 approach	 the	 issue	 of	 financial	 reform	
differently	from	the	current	discourse	on	the	subject.	The	current	discourse	never	considers	
the	necessity	of	reforming	(investment)	company	legislation	itself,	focusing	instead	mostly	
on	 how	 to	 externally	 regulate	 the	 greedy	 and	 ill‐behaved	 finance	 sector	 by	 adding	more	
regulatory	 schemes	 and	 governmental	 intervention.	 This	 paper	 briefly	 discusses	 in	 the	
conclusion	how	to	 reform	(investment)	 company	 law	or	 the	structure	of	 the	 law	 itself	 in	
order	to	create	a	just,	stable,	and	sustainable	financial	system.	
This	 paper	 begins	 by	 examining	 how	 property	 rights	 originated	 in	 the	 late	 Roman	
Republic	 and	 how	 these	 rights	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 fundamentally	 different	 from	
contractual	rights	by	traditional	Roman	law.	The	paper	then	explores	how	the	law	in	modern	
times	 has	 come	 to	 grant	 the	 privileges	 of	 property	 to	 its	 opposite,	 contractual	 rights,	 in	






















the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 late	 Roman	 Republic,	 and	 before	 the	 time	 the	 Romans	 considered	












in	rem	 are	such	a	power	 is	 to	rip	out	a	 thing	 from	all	 social	 relationship	with	others	and	
thereby	 allow	 an	owner	 to	 exert	 absolute	 power	over	 the	 thing	without	 agreement	with	
others.	For	example,	if	land	becomes	the	object	of	absolute	individual	property,	it	should	be	
ripped	 from	 its	 social	 relationship.	 But	 this	 is	metaphysically	 impossible	 because	 land	 is	






land	 in	early	modern	 times	entailed	violence	against	peasants.	This	violence	seems	 to	be	































it	 “a	capital	offence	 to	 take	a	coin	with	 the	 image	of	Augustus	 into	a	brothel	or	 lavatory”	




















exist	 either.	 We	 don’t	 know	 precisely	 when	 and	 how	 calculative	 interest‐bearing	 debts	
originated,	 because	 they	predate	writing	 (Graeber	2011,	 p.	 64).	 Also,	we	don’t	 know	 the	
precise	historical	origin	of	money	whose	social	role	is	to	finally	settle	such	debts.	But	some	











be	expected	 to	produce	 surplus.	But	 consumer	 loans—usury	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	of	 the	




how	 the	 society	 solved	 such	 a	 debt	 crisis	 in	 consumer	 loans	was	 “clean	 slate”	 by	which	
Sumerian	 and	 Babylonian	 kings	 periodically	 announced	 general	 amnesties:	 the	 debt	
cancellation	of	consumer	loans	and	the	return	of	land	to	the	peasantry	(Graeber	2011,	p.	65).		
However,	the	social	role	of	money	changed	significantly	when	coinage	was	invented	





ancient	 credit	 economy	 like	 ancient	 Mesopotamia,	 gold,	 silver,	 and	 bronze	 had	 been	
stockpiled	in	temples.	But	now	they	were	plundered	by	Roman	soldiers,	minted	by	slaves	
captured	in	war,	and	distributed	to	soldiers	and	the	population	on	a	massive	scale	(Graeber	
2011,	 pp.	 228‐229).	 Plundered	money	 could	 allow	 population	 to	 ease	 their	 urgent	 debt	
obligation.	
In	addition	to	the	general	military	option	of	distributing	coins,	coins	were	also	used	






1970,	 45).	 A	 sestertius	 was	 previously	 valued	 at	 four	 asses.	 Interestingly,	 according	 to	












In	 inventing	 the	 absolute	 power	 of	 property	 owners	 in	 the	 image	 of	 the	 finality	 of	
money,	 the	 traditional	 Roman	 law	 considered	 property	 rights	 to	 be	 different	 from	
contractual	rights.	And	in	the	Roman	law,	property	rights	and	contractual	rights	cannot	be	
mixed	 with	 them.	 For	 example,	 under	 Roman	 law,	 a	 depositor’s	 rights	 are	 considered	
different	from	a	creditor’s	rights.	The	rights	of	a	depositor	are,	on	the	one	hand,	rights	in	rem,	








	 Legal	Category	 Ownership	 Purpose	 Temporality	 Reserve	













loan	 deposited	 funds	 for	 profit	 while	 depositors	 enjoy	 the	 rights	 to	 withdraw	 and	 use	
deposits	at	any	time	on	demand.	This	mixture	is	the	essence	of	modern	commercial	banking.	
This	 was	 systematically	 institutionalized	 first	 by	 London	 goldsmith‐bankers	 in	 late	
seventeenth‐century	 England.	 This	 beginning	 of	 modern	 commercial	 banking	 has	 been	
examined	 extensively	 by	 myself	 elsewhere	 (2011).	 What	 goldsmith‐bankers	
institutionalized	was	the	propertization	of	a	contract.	These	goldsmiths	made	a	loan	contract	
with	 their	 depositors.	 In	 this	 contract,	 the	 depositors	 allowed	 the	 goldsmiths	 to	 loan	
deposited	funds	to	third	parties	in	the	bankers’	name	for	profit.	Here,	the	goldsmith	became	
debtors,	 and	 the	 depositors	 became	 creditors.	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 contract	 was	
propertized	because	the	depositors	were	still	granted	property	rights	to	withdraw	and	use	
deposits	at	any	time	on	demand.	



















law	 was	 still	 limited	 due	 to	 its	 strict	 division	 of	 rights	 in	 rem	 and	 rights	 in	 personam.	
Shareholders	in	MMFs	likely	think	that	they	deserve	what	they	now	enjoy—including	voting	
rights	at	general	meetings,	redemption	rights	on	demand,	and	limited	liability.	But	from	a	
historical	 legal	perspective,	what	 they	enjoy	 is	an	undeserved	privilege	 that	other	simple	
creditors	or	property	owners	cannot	enjoy.	By	mixing	rights	in	rem	and	rights	in	personam	
cleverly,	the	privilege	allows	shareholders	to	enjoy	the	benefits	and	reduce	the	costs	of	both	








dismiss	 directors.	 And	 a	 company	 is	 legally	 bound	 to	 work	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 its	
















this	 distant	 controlling	 power	 explains,	 as	 shall	 be	 seen,	 how	 shareholders	 enjoy	 the	
privilege	that	other	simple	creditors	or	property	owners	cannot	enjoy.	
Some	 scholars	might	 disagree	with	my	argument	 that	 shareholders	 enjoy	property	
rights.	And	they	might	argue	that	the	company	cannot	be	owned	because	it	is	not	a	thing	that	
can	be	owned.	Against	this	counterargument,	I	suggest	two	facts	that	they	should	consider.	
First,	 property	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 transform	what	 is	 essentially	 not	 an	 object	 of	 exclusive	
possession	of	an	individual	or	collective	person	into	property.	As	mentioned,	slave	and	land	







How	 to	 substantially	 put	 a	 corporation	 under	 the	 possessive	 power	 of	 dominant	
shareholders	 depends	 on	 the	 concrete	 methods	 of	 corporate	 governance	 as	 well	 as	 on	
political	and	 legal	environment.	The	current	corporate	governance	mechanism	in	the	U.S.	
seems	 to	 allow	 the	 largest	 shareholder	 to	 substantially	 put	 a	 corporation	 under	 her/his	
































who	 has	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 voting	 rights	 enough	 to	monopolistically	 controlling	 a	




be	completely	 transferred	 to	 the	company	 from	shareholders.	This	 legal	decision	 implied	
that	shareholders	were	no	longer	the	owners	of	the	property	of	the	company.	And	via	the	
1855‐62	Companies	 Acts	 the	 law	 granted	 them	 limited	 liability.	Here,	 the	 legal	 status	 of	
shareholders	became	like	that	of	creditors,	who	lose	only	their	loaned	money	when	a	debtor	
goes	 bankrupt.	 This	 creditor’s	 right—limited	 liability—was	 granted	 to	 shareholders,	
according	 to	 Ireland	 (2010),	 not	 because	 of	 the	 demands	 of	 advanced	 technology	 and	
economic	 efficiency,	 but	 because	 of	 a	 political	 demand	 to	 accommodate	 and	 protect	 the	
interest	 of	 rentier	 investors.	 Ireland	 argues	 that	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom	 at	 that	 time	 did	 not	 need	 limited	 liability	 because	 manufacturing	 was	
predominantly	carried	out	by	ordinary	partnership	(Ireland	2010,	p.	839).		
This	dual	treatment	of	the	individual	members	of	a	corporation	not	only	as	its	owners	






to	 other	 partners.	 By	 contrast,	 a	 creditor	 is	 an	outsider	who	 has	 limited	 liability	when	 a	
debtor	goes	bankrupt	and	who	has	no	responsibility	for	the	debtor’s	wrongful	behaviour.	
This	 differentiation	 of	 partnerships	 and	 loans	 was	 inherited	 by	 canon	 law	 in	 medieval	
Europe	and	was	received	into	civil	law	and	English	partnership	law	(Ireland	1999,	pp.	35‐









	 Legal	Category	 Ownership	 Assets,	 duties,	responsibilities	 Liability	
Partnership	 Rights	in	rem	 Not	transferred	 Shared	 Unlimited	
Loans	 Rights	 in	
personam	 Transferred	 Not	shared	 Limited	
	
The	 law’s	ambivalent	 treatment	of	 shareholders	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	ambivalent	 legal	
definition	 of	 shares.	 The	most	 popular	 definition	was	 provided	by	 Farwell	 J	 in	Borland’s	
Trustee	v.	Steel	Bros	&	Co	Ltd	in	1901:	
A	 share	 is	 the	 interest	 of	 a	 shareholder	 in	 the	 company	measured	 by	 a	 sum	of	
money,	for	the	purpose	of	liability	in	the	first	place,	and	of	interest	in	the	second,	
but	 also	 consisting	 of	 a	 series	 of	 mutual	 covenants	 entered	 into	 by	 all	 the	





This	 definition	 is	 ambivalent	 because	 it	 contains	 two	 distinct	 rights	 together:	 creditors’	
rights	and	property	rights.	The	words	“the	purpose	of	liability”	imply	creditors’	rights,	but	
the	words	“interest	in	the	company”	imply	property	rights.	In	spite	of	this	ambivalence,	this	




an	 object	 of	 dominion,	 i.e.	 of	 rights	 in	 rem”	 (Davies	 1997,	 p.	 144).	 And	 recently,	 in	Her	
Majesty’s	 Commissioners	 of	 Inland	 Revenue	 v.	 Laird	 Group	 PLC	 in	 2003,	 Lord	 Millet	
emphasized	the	property	rights	of	shares:		
It	is	customary	to	describe	[a	share]	as	“bundle	of	rights	and	liabilities,”	and	this	is	
probably	 the	 nearest	 that	 one	 can	 get	 to	 its	 character,	 provided	 that	 it	 is	






































the	 shareholders,	 the	shareholders	 enjoy	rights	 in	rem,	 and	 the	 relationship	between	 the	
shareholders	and	the	funds	is	an	owner‐representative	relationship.	On	the	other	hand,	the	










his	 or	 her	 name	 only	 when	 he	 or	 she	 has	 ownership	 of	 it.	 As	 long	 as	 the	 ownership	 is	
transferred,	 the	 rights	of	MMF	 shareholders	 are	 rights	 in	personam,	 and	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 shareholders	 and	 MMFs	 is	 a	 creditor‐debtor	 relationship.	 How	 can	 the	
ownership	of	a	thing	be	transferred	and	not	transferred	simultaneously?	This	situation	is	self‐
contradictory,	and	this	self‐contradiction	occurs	because	of	propertization,	that	is,	because	





loan	 has	 been	 what	 economics	 today	 calls	 opportunity	 cost.	 Interest	 is	 considered	





This	 propertized	 hybridity	 is	 the	money‐creation	mechanism	 of	modern	 finance.	 It	
creates	 a	 double‐ownership	 structure	 in	which	 two	exclusive	owners—shareholders	 and	
MMFs—enjoy	the	present	availability	of	the	same	amount	of	funds.	This	double‐ownership	
is	a	creation	of	an	additional	ownership	title	on	one	and	the	same	amount	of	money.	This	
double	 ownership	 differs	 from	 fragmented	 or	 shared	 ownership.	 While	 in	 fragmented	
ownership	 each	 owner	 has	 exclusive	 ownership	 of	 only	 part	 of	 the	 property,	 in	 double	
ownership	 each	 owner	 has	 exclusive	 ownership	 of	 the	whole	 property.	While	 in	 shared	
ownership	each	owner	cannot	use	or	sell	a	shared	property	without	the	consent	of	other	
owners,	 in	double	ownership	 each	owner	has	 the	 free	 right	 to	use	 and	 sell	 the	 property	
without	the	consent	of	the	other	owners.		
To	 sum	 up,	 the	 hybridity	 of	 shareholders’	 rights	 aims	 to	 enhance	 the	 absolute	
ownership	 of	 property—rights	 in	 rem.	 To	 express	 this	 situation	 in	 Hegelian	 style,	
shareholders	enhance	their	property	rights	far	beyond	the	limit	of	traditional	property	rights	
by	 appropriating	 their	 opposite,	 creditors’	 rights,	 as	 their	 element.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
enhancement	grows	out	of	the	pure	individualism	of	rights	in	rem	but	utilizes	its	opposite:	
rights	in	personam	and	collectivism	(the	legal	personality	of	a	company).		
If	 this	 situation	 is	 described	 the	 other	way	 around,	 the	 enhancement	 can	 be	 called	
propertization.	As	mentioned	before,	shareholders,	including	MMF	shareholders,	are	almost	
reduced	 to	 creditors	 in	 their	 economic	 substance.	 Following	 this	 trend,	 Bligh	 v.	 Brent	







limited	 liability.	Because	 the	 law	began	 to	 treat	 shareholders	as	 creditors,	 it	 should	have	
stopped	 granting	 them	 the	 opposite—property	 rights—if	 it	 had	 wanted	 to	 maintain	
consistency	 in	 the	 legal	 principle	 that	 separates	 the	 two	 legal	 categories—property	 and	
contract.	But	the	law	has	given	up	its	consistency	by	continuing	to	grant	property	rights	as	
well.	In	the	case	of	MMFs,	shareholders	still	enjoy	the	ability	to	finalize	their	creditor‐debtor	
contracts	 freely	 at	 any	 time	 on	 demand	 by	writing	 checks.	 This	 propertization	 creates	 a	
double‐ownership	 scheme,	 a	money‐creation	mechanism.	Here,	propertization	grants	 the	
privileged	finality	of	money,	in	whose	image	the	concept	of	property	was	created,	to	creditor‐
debtor	contracts,	and	by	doing	so	it	transforms	credit	into	money.	
This	propertization	 is	 a	 key	 cause	of	 the	 emergence	of	big	 institutional	 debtors.	By	
offering	 shareholders	 the	 two	 disparate	 benefits	 together—interest	 gathering	 and	
redemption	rights	on	demand—MMFs	can	collect	huge	amounts	of	capital.	Because	most	of	






87).	 This	 rapid	 growth	 has	 been	 possible	 because	MMFs	 have	 offered	 both	 the	demand‐




























Before	 the	 2008	 crisis,	 as	 I	 (2014a)	 argues	 elsewhere,	 off‐balance‐sheet	 financing	










within	 the	 demand	 side	 of	 the	 off‐balance‐sheet	 financing,	 when	 investors,	 especially	
institutional	 investors,	 created	 a	 run	on	MMFs	 (Brunnermeier	2009;	Gorton	and	Metrick	
2010).	 Unlike	 other	 mutual	 funds,	 MMFs	 are	 exempted	 by	 the	 Security	 and	 Exchange	









































This	 double‐ownership	 scheme	 has	 historically	 created	 financial	 crises,	 exposing	 a	
community	to	a	new	type	of	risk	like	the	risk	in	a	“pass	the	parcel”	game,	in	which	“the	loser	
is	 the	 one	 holding	 the	 parcel	 when	 the	 music	 stops”	 (Kim	 2011).	 When	 depositors	 in	
commercial	banks	suddenly	realize	that	the	banks’	loans	to	third	parties	are	in	trouble,	they	
create	a	run	on	the	banks	in	order	not	to	be	the	loser.	A	similar	form	of	bank	run	happened	






MMFs	 also	 expanded	 the	 crisis	 by	 contributing	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 another	
propertization,	a	repo.	A	repo	consists	of	two	sales	transactions	in	which	the	seller	(in	our	
example,	a	broker‐dealer)	sells	an	asset	to	the	buyer	(in	our	example,	MMFs)	with	a	promise	













Company	Act	 restricted	mutual	 fund	 investment	 in	 entities	 engaged	 in	 securities‐related	
businesses,	 because	 a	 mutual	 fund	 can	 be	 exposed	 to	 the	 risks	 of	 the	 business.	 This	
restriction	should	have	been	applied	to	repos	when	a	broker‐dealer	is	counterparty,	because	
MMFs’	investment	in	repos	is	in	economic	substance	a	loan	and	MMFs	are	therefore	exposed	










sale,	 even	 though	 they	 are	 in	 economic	 substance	 a	 secured	 loan.	Unlike	 a	 secured	 loan,	
however,	a	repo	satisfies	the	above	condition	(1).	Because	a	repo	takes	the	form	of	a	sale,	the	
ownership	of	collateral	is	transferred	from	a	debtor	(a	seller)	to	a	creditor	(a	buyer,	MMFs	in	





our	 case,	 an	MMF).	The	 creditor	 (buyer)	 is	 only	obliged	 to	 replace	 the	 collateral	with	an	
equivalent	security	by	the	date	of	the	repurchase	contract.		
A	 single	 piece	 of	 collateral	 is	 often	 used	 to	 effect	 settlement	 in	 a	 number	 of	 repo	
contracts	on	the	same	day.	This	further	use	of	collateral	is	called	rehypothecation.	Through	
rehypothecation,	for	example,	a	broker‐dealer	can	leverage	her	initial	capital	twenty	times	
















investment	 when	 the	 seller	 goes	 bankrupt.	 Because	 repos	 are	 loan	 contracts	 in	 their	
economic	substance,	they	should	have	been	subject	to	the	Chapter	11	bankruptcy	process.	
This	bankruptcy	process	is	designed	to	distribute	the	assets	of	a	bankrupt	debtor	as	fairly	as	
possible	 among	 the	 creditors.	 The	 process	 includes	 an	 automatic	 stay,	 which	 prevents	
creditors	 from	 collecting	 a	 debtor’s	 assets	 before	 a	 court	 assesses	 both	 the	 value	 of	 the	
debtor’s	assets	and	 the	 full	 extent	of	 creditors’	 claims.	The	process	also	voids	any	 recent	
payments	made	by	the	firm,	because	payments	made	just	prior	to	bankruptcy	can	favour	one	
creditor	over	others.	This	procedure	 is	called	avoidance.	Thus,	collateral	posted	against	a	




selling	 collaterals	 before	 their	 prices	 collapse,	 even	 when	 a	 debtor	 goes	 bankrupt.	 This	
advantage	 of	 repos	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 giving	 creditors	 of	 repos	 an	 unfair	 privilege	
because	 other	 creditors	 cannot	 withdraw	 their	 loans	 until	 after	 a	 court	 decision.	 This	
privilege	 is	a	property	right—the	right	of	property	owners	 to	withdraw	their	money	and	

























stay	 during	 the	 bankruptcy	process.	 This	 decision	 aimed	 to	 defeat	 the	 artful	 self‐serving	
attempts	by	lawyers	and	financiers	to	make	loan	transactions	look	like	sale	transactions	in	
order	 to	 avoid	 the	 bankruptcy	 process	 (Schroeder	 1996).	 But	 this	 court’s	 decision	 so	
distressed	the	government,	the	Federal	Reserve,	and	the	financial	community,	which	feared	
that	 it	 would	 impair	 repo	 markets,	 that	 Congress	 attempted	 to	 override	 it	 in	 1984	 by	
amending	 the	 Bankruptcy	 Code	 and	 exempting	 repos	 from	 the	 bankruptcy	 process	
(Schroeder	1996,	p.	1011).	Since	then,	when	the	courts	have	considered	the	nature	of	repos	
for	bankruptcy	purposes,	they	have	determined	them	to	be	sales,	and	to	support	this	decision	
they	 have	 prioritized	 the	 form	 of	 the	 contracts	 over	 their	 substance.5	This	 prioritization	
differs	from	the	early	decisions	of	the	courts	in	United	States	v.	Drickson	(1979)	and	SEC	v.	
Miller	 (1980),	 which	 considered	 the	 economic	 substance	 of	 the	 contract	 when	 they	
addressed	the	nature	of	repos.	But	US	courts	still	consider	the	economic	substance	of	the	
contract	 when	 they	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 taxability	 of	 the	 interest	 income	
received	 by	 the	 creditors	 of	 repos.	 For	 example,	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court,	 in	











for	an	old	solution	 to	debt	crises.	Previously,	 in	Babylonian,	 Sumerian,	and	other	ancient	
civilizations,	consumer	debts,	which	ordinary	people	owed	to	tax	farmers,	were	cancelled	
without	 the	 use	 of	 money.	 They	 were	 simply	 cancelled	 by	 the	 emperor	 in	 a	 periodic	
“redemption”	or	“year	of	jubilation.”	The	difference	from	this	old	solution	was	that	money	
allowed	the	Romans	to	solve	debt	crises	even	when	creditors	were	still	repaid—that	is,	even	





























I	 conclude	 this	 paper	 by	 commenting	 on	 a	 possible	 reform	 policy	 of	 the	 current	
financial	system	from	a	new	perspective.	This	comment	is	brief	and	incomplete,	but	it	offers	
a	direction	for	future	research.	The	current	discourse	focuses	on	how	to	externally	regulate	








shareholders	 are	 merely	 functionless	 creditors	 with	 limited	 responsibility.	 The	 reform	
would	involve	no	longer	granting	them	property	rights	in	their	shares,	that	is,	to	abolish	the	
redemption	rights	of	MMF	shareholders	at	par.		














have	 considered	 property	 rights	 to	 be	 natural	 and	 inviolable,	 and	 have	 argued	 that	 they	
should	therefore	be	protected	by	the	state.	Following	this	line	of	reasoning,	property	rights	
have	been	established	at	law.	Others	have	maintained	that	property	rights	are	created	by	an	
agreement	 between	 people	 and	 can	 thus	 be	 redistributed,	 regulated,	 or	 re‐contracted	
through	another	agreement	or	by	the	state	for	the	purpose	of	the	wellbeing	of	society.	This	
paper	attempts	to	contribute	to	the	rediscovery	of	this	classical	discussion	of	property	rights	
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